Kathleen Okruhlik and Elizabeth Anderson each discuss cases in which the background social
and ethical values of scientists led them (i) to recognize previously overlooked evidence that
bears on a scientific hypothesis, or – more dramatically, as in Anderson’s discussion – (ii) to
decide some phenomena, like emotional experiences, could count as evidence at all.
Note that (i) and (ii) are different claims. In (i), all researchers involved agree that – for example – male and female primate behavior is relevant evidence for evaluating hypotheses about
the dynamics of primate social communities. Many of the (primarily male) primatologists of
the 1950s and 60s had simply failed to pay as much attention to female primate behavior, and
so had overlooked evidence. If (ii) is correct, it raises the possibility of two communities of
scientists, both interested in the same subject, who disagree about whether some phenomenon
is even relevant to that subject. (For example, one team of addiction researchers may treat
the testimony of current addicts as important evidence for developing treatment strategies;
another team, who thinks that addiction is a moral failing and addicts are inveterate liars,
will discount this testimony as evidentially worthless.)
Suppose that (ii) is correct: groups of scientists with different background social and ethical values can sometimes legitimately disagree about what counts as evidence. Would that
threaten the objectivity of scientific inquiry? According to Anderson, if social and ethical values satisfy certain conditions then they can play a legitimate role in scientific inquiry. What
are those conditions? Do you agree with Anderson that those conditions are sufficient?
What kind of evidence can scientists draw upon to settle disagreements about background
social and ethical values? Anderson has one suggestion – what does she propose, and do you
agree with her? Why or why not?
Finally: do you think (ii) is, in fact, correct? Justify your answer.
