Objective
In this assignment you will be asked to evaluate, in light of theories above, what we might need to say that our actions are in fact free. Is there a satisfactory theory of freedom that can preserve the feeling that we do make genuine agential choices all the time? If not–and if freewill and moral responsibility are an illusion–how should we square this with the fact that this illusion persists nonetheless? That is, if neither Chisholm’s libertarian conception of agency causation or Frankfurt’s version of compatibilism prove satisfactory, how should we revise our beliefs about freedom and moral responsibility?
Steps
What is an objection to Chisholm’s conception of agent causation? Can Chisholm satisfactorily respond to this objection? Why or why not? (at least 90 words)
What is an objection to Frankfurt’s version of compatibilism? Can he respond to the objection? Why or why not? (at least 90 words)
Which of the two theories–Chisholm’s conception of agent causation or Frankfurt’s version of compatibilism–do you find more compelling, and why? If you don’t find either compelling, explain why you think skepticism about freewill and moral responsibility more reasonable? If you do land on the side of the freewill skeptic, explain how we might revise our beliefs about freedom and moral responsibility
