Prompt #1: In the paper, The Self and The Future, Bernard Williams presents two thought experiments. The first thought experimentthe body swapping scenariois intended to show that personal identity is constituted by psychological continuity; however, Williams presents a second thought experiment (a re-description of the first) that is intended to undermine this intuition, and suggests instead that personal identity is constituted by bodily continuity. What serious objections could be raised against Williams conclusion? Can Williams respond to these objections?
Prompt #2: Derek Parfit argues that questions concerning personal identity, when conceived in terms of numerical (one-to-one) identity, may have no true answer. Instead, Parfit thinks that we should conceive of personal identity in terms of relations of degree. Thus, Parfits conception of the self, in so far as it makes sense to think of a singular self at all, is much more porous and diffuse than conceptions of numerical identity would have us suppose. Reconstruct Parfits argument and evaluate its strength or weakness by raising an objection. Can Parfit respond to such an objection?
