The chapter by Vaughan (Vaughan, Diane. 1996. “Lessons Learned.” Pp. 387-422 in The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) focuses on the negotiation of risk for the Space Shuttle Challenger’s Solid Rocket Booster system. Her book (including this chapter) was a response to the prevailing views on the cause of the disaster.
A. What were some of the challenges that engineers faced as they designed and tested the shuttle system (i.e., before the shuttle system went operational)? Be sure to identify and explain at least three significant challenges.
B. Were engineers at NASA relying primarily on objective or subjective probabilities to estimate risk? Briefly explain the difference between objective and subjective probabilities and give at least one example to support your answer.
C. Diane Vaughan coined the phrase ‘the normalization of deviance’ to explain why NASA engineers decided to launch the space shuttle Challenger despite concerns over possible O-Ring failures in cold weather. Please explain the meaning of the phrase, ‘the normalization of deviance’, and give at least one example to illustrate the process of normalization.
D. While there were concerns about the O-rings going back to 1977, the shuttle system went operational in 1981 (i.e., actual flights began in 1981). How do you think having data from actual launches shaped the engineers’ risk assessments? Be sure to support your argument.
