1.The organisational structure of intelligence and failure to share information. 2.Was there a policy failure on the part of the U.S Government whereby warning signs or increased terrorist attacks were being ignored. 3.Bureaucratic obstacles 4.Did a lack of technology in analysing intelligence contribute to the intelligence failure that led to 9/11 attacks. Bibliography: 9/11 Commission (2004), The 9/11 Commission Report. Amy Zegart (2007), 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure, Intelligence and National Security, 22:2, 165-184 Christina Shelton (2011), The Roots of Analytic Failures in the U.S. Intelligence Community, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24:4, 637-655. Dahl, Erik J, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Habor to 9/11 and Beyond, George University Press, 2013. Hedley, J. (2005), Learning from Intelligence Failures, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 18:3, 435-450. Melvin A Goodman (2003), 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 18:4, 59-71. Paul R. Pillar (2006) Good literature and bad history: The 9/11 commission’s tale of strategic intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 21:6, 1022 – 1044. Stephen Marrin (2011), The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence and National Security, 26:2-3, 182-202. Smith, David A. (2004), Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, Naval War College Review, Vol 57(3), Article 21. Further instructions: More arguments to be raised and points should be made backed with evidence and more sources than provided should be used.
