Skinners whole case depends on determining whether or not intentional explanation (citing beliefs, desires, etc.) on the one hand and proper, ultimate, scientific explanation s on the other hand, co-exist? Can they both be true. (p. 64)
Dennett presents two arguments for his view that intentional explanations are compatible and then diagnoses what he takes to be Skinners error.
First, he argues that Skinners view would lead to an absurd regress in which computers can do nothing but are only governed by electrical currents (and the laws covering them). Since computers clearly do things, this argument cannot be sound. So, we need not conclude that intentional explanations are incorrect. Dennett would have to argue there was some type of reinforcement and special conditioning for the computer to be successful
Second, he argues by analogy:
1. Reductive explanations exclude (or eliminate) the thing reduced.
2. There is a reductive explanation for color in terms of colorless atoms.
3. Therefore there is no such thing as color.
4. But this result is absurd; there is color.
5. Skinners argument is like this one.
6. Therefore, there is no reason to think that intentional explanations are incorrect.
Dennetts view is that explanations vindicate the intentional explanations rather than eliminate them.
