(1)How does ELINT contribute to both tactical and strategic intelligence efforts? Provide specific examples to argue your points of view.
(2) Put yourself in the place of a SIGINT operator. Identify 10 specific lessons from this course that you would apply to SIGINT collection or analysis.
(3) Is it possible to over-rely on SIGINT? What are the possible implications of over-reliance on a single intelligence collection stream?
See references for topics below. Feel free to use them or other resources.
References
Alvarez, D. (2013). Allied and axis signals intelligence in World War 2. London: Routledge.
Bernard, R. L. (2012). In the forefront of foreign missile and space intelligence: History of the defense special missile and aerospace center, 1960-2010. Washington, DC: Center for Cryptologic History.
Budiansky, S. (1999). Too late for Pearl Harbor. Proceedings Magazine, 125(12/1), 162.
Carraher, S. M. (2013). Signaling intelligence, management history, marry-go round and research. Journal of Management History, 19(2).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jmh.2013.15819baa.001.
Clausen, I. & Miller, E. A. (Eds.). (2012). Intelligence revolution 1960: Retrieving the coronaimagery that helped win the Cold War. Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance.
Ford, C. & Rosenberg, D. (2014). The admirals advantage: U.S. Navy operational intelligence in World War 2 and the Cold War. New York, NY: Naval Institute Press
Koot, M. R. (2014). Sigint: definition, qualities, problems and limitations. Retrieved from https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2014/10/sigint-definition-intrinsic-qualities-problems-andlimitations-
quotes-from-aid-wiebes-2001/
Kroger, C. A. (1993, Sep. 22). ELINT: A scientific intelligence system. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/ vol2no1/html/v02i1a06p_0001.htm.
Lowenthal, M. M. (2014). Intelligence: From secrets to policy. Boston, MA: CQ Press.
Morton, T. (2012). Manned airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Strategic tactical both? Air & Space Power Journal, 31(1), 34-52.
Richelson, J. T. (2015). The US technology community (7th ed.). New York, NY: Westview Press.
Silverstein, K. (2015, Sep. 11). US reliance on too much SIGINT and too little spycraft is dangerous and expensive. Observer. Retrieved from http://observer.com/2015/09/usreliance- on-too-much-sigint-and-too-little-spycraft-is-dangerous-and-expensive/
Wiley, R. G. (2006). ELINT: The interception and analysis of radar signals. Norwood, MA: Artech House.
