Consider the sentence ‘It was once the case that nothing had the property of being an iPhone’, which the A-theorist might regiment as ‘WAS¬∃x(IPHONE(x))’.
A. (3 points) Suppose you utter the sentence at 10pm on Oct 21 2021. Assume the B- theory (so eternalism+B-theory). Describe two propositions the sentence might express according to the B-theorist who accepts reductionism about tense/“the date theory” depending on whether the quantifier ‘nothing’ is read as restricted to objects at a time or as unrestricted. Explain why, given B-theory and eternalism, plausibly one of these propositions is true and the other is false.
B. (3 points) Reread pages 21-22 of section 2.1 of Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism (where he discusses tense according to the growing block theory). Now consider what the proponent of the growing block will say about the sentence (again suppose you utter the sentence at 10pm on Oct 21 2021). If the standard growing-blocker adopts the usual B-theoretic “date theory” translation procedure for utterances about the past, what truth values will the two propositions from part A have on her theory? Justify your answer. Then explain why this might suggest that proponents of the growing block can’t straightforwardly adopt the date theory of the B-theorist.
